Nts Revenue Sharing Agreement

PTV was unable to provide evidence to support the rationale and evaluation process for some of the performance benchmarks that allowed franchisees to negotiate only an extension of franchise agreements. Given the commercial value of such a right, PTV must carefully consider how franchisees have been assessed against the performance criterion so that lessons learned are taken into account when negotiating future agreements. (b) Any dispute under this Agreement (including any matter relating to its existence, validity and termination) that is not resolved by mutual agreement after negotiation in good faith within thirty (30) days of notification of a Dispute shall be finally resolved at Seller`s sole discretion, either by filing the claim with (i) the Los Angeles Superior Court; State of California or (ii) binding arbitration before a mutually acceptable arbitrator in Los Angeles County, State of California, pursuant to the American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules. Buyer and Seller agree not to bring any action, action or legal proceeding against each other arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or its performance in any jurisdiction other than the State of California. In all disputes resolved by the above methods, the prevailing party shall be entitled to all reasonable attorneys` fees and expenses. The current agreements include a six-year evaluation period to determine whether franchisees meet the criteria for negotiating a contract extension. At the end of this period, PTV assessed the overall performance of the two franchisees and found that they had met the criteria set out in the MR3 agreements. Figures 4B and 4C show the result of this assessment. Develop and submit operational and project management plans on specific dates to protect revenues from the negative impact of special events (such as the Grand Prix and White Night Festival). It is encouraging to see that the planning of PTV`s negotiations with franchisees has been thorough. PTV has developed a deep understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the current agreements and has identified significant and achievable opportunities for improvement. The franchise agreement describes the obligations relating to the provision of services, network development and service planning, rolling stock, payments and variations, operational incentives, law enforcement and how the franchise is re-tendered. The Buyer undertakes to bear the costs related to the collection of an overdue amount, including reasonable attorneys` fees.

Efficient and reliable public transport is essential to the economic prosperity and quality of life of the state. In Victoria, since 1999, urban trains and trams have been operated by private operators operating under various franchise agreements with the state government. Current metropolitan train and tram (MR3) franchise agreements include an Operational Performance Regime (OPR) and a Customer Experience Performance Regime (CEPR). Monthly assessment based on thresholds and benchmarks established at the beginning of MR3 based on past performance. The agreement states that benchmarks may be revised and modified in certain circumstances, such as calendar changes .B. The two agreements initially lasted eight years and expire in November 2017. Regional trains (V/line) are not part of these agreements. Determine if the 2004 franchise agreements were good value for the urban rail and tram network. The former Ministry of Transport, which created the MR3 franchise agreements, was dissolved in 2013 and its functions were divided between the current Ministry of Transport of the current Ministry of Economic Development, Employment, Transport and Resources (DEDJTR) and PTV.

Weaknesses in the design of service regulations and in the management of PTV contracts mean that it does not derive maximum value for money from its franchise agreements. PTV has developed an Efficient Operator Comparator (EOC) to show that MR4 agreements offer good value for money. EOC compares the operating costs estimated by franchisees with those of comparablely efficient rail operators. EOC is an important tool – PTV has recognized that the absence of competitive tensions in the negotiation process has increased the need to create good value for money. Figure 1A summarizes the history of franchise agreements for Victoria`s train and streetcar services. In preparation for these MR4 negotiations, PTV carried out a project to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the current agreements and to identify opportunities to improve value for money in future franchise agreements. PTV`s project to prepare the MR4 franchise agreements was thorough and provides a solid basis for obtaining good value for money from the new agreements. However, getting good value for money from these agreements depends on successful negotiations and the effective implementation and management of future franchise agreements. As part of franchise agreements, flexible benchmarks must: PTV has determined that both MTM and Yarra Trams have met the performance criteria set out in the agreements, allowing them to negotiate a new franchise agreement that will be known as MR4. If these negotiations fail, the state could extend the contract for up to three years at a fixed price while conducting a bidding process for new franchisees. Public transport is an essential service for many Victorians, and an efficient transport system is crucial to the economic prosperity and quality of life of the state.

Public Transport Victoria (PTV) is responsible for managing contracts with operators who operate the city`s passenger train and tram networks, known as franchise agreements. Agreements must be well designed, and effective contract management policies, processes and systems must be in place to ensure that these agreements provide value for money to the State of Victoria. As part of this audit, we examined how PTV manages its franchise agreements and monitors assets leased to franchisees to improve the performance of the train and streetcar network. We also assessed how PTV and the Department of Economic Development, Employment, Transportation and Resources prepared for future franchise agreements. In our audit report, we made five recommendations, all of which were accepted by PTV. As part of the franchise agreements for trains and trams, PTV (then the former Ministry of Transport) established annual benchmarks and advised each franchisee on compliance with these standards. We also found that PTV had developed an appropriate plan for stakeholder engagement and communication and maintained a detailed record of stakeholder engagement. Governing bodies and workshops allowed for effective consultation within the PTV and between the PTV and other external departments and stakeholders. This stakeholder engagement helped PTV gain a detailed understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the MR3 agreements and identify opportunities for improvement. In October 2015, PTV concluded an internal audit of the contractual management of the tram franchise agreement. PTV believes that the identified shortcomings could also be applied to the management of the railway concession agreement. Gaps include: PTV has prepared for future franchise agreements by taking an in-depth look at the strengths and weaknesses of its current agreements.

To support negotiations with current franchisees, PTV has developed a deep understanding of operating costs and identified opportunities to improve the franchisee`s financial information. This puts PTV in a good position to negotiate significant improvements with franchisees. DEDJTR is responsible for the policy and planning of state transport and infrastructure. He oversees negotiations on new franchise agreements, and the DEDJTR Secretary heads the main governing body of this project. We found that PTV`s consultation and communication with franchisees regarding the establishment and evaluation of performance benchmarks was conducted by email or was not recorded. .